Our Results

Cascone & Kluepfel, LLP is proud of our track record of success in all areas of liability defense. Select a categoy below to view some of our results.

Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Trip and Fall Case Dismissed Against Client, Town

1/20/2022

Plaintiff was injured when she stepped in a hole in a road while jogging. The road is owned and maintained by our municipal client (“Town”). The plaintiff claimed the hole was the result of a prior negligent repair. Plaintiff further argued the Town had prior written notice of the hole through a telephone complaint that was reduced to writing by the Town six weeks prior to the accident. On motion, we established that while repairs were made more than two years before the accident, there were no recent repairs that resulted in an immediate hazard as required to hold the Town responsible for negligently creating the condition. We also established through case law that making note of a telephone complaint does not satisfy the prior written notice requirement to maintain suit against the Town. In its decision on our motion, the court found that the Town did not create the hole and did not have prior written notice of it, and dismissed plaintiff’s complaint against our client as a matter of law.

(Supreme Court, Suffolk County, January 2022)

Labor Law Claims Dismissed Against Plumbing Subcontractor

10/28/2021

Plaintiff fell when he stepped on a cinder block with his right foot which then became entangled in electrical extension cords causing him to fall at a home renovation project in Queens. Plaintiff sustained a fractured cervical vertebra and a fracture hip, necessitating a total right hip replacement.

Upon completion of all depositions, we moved for summary judgment on the issue of liability showing the Court our client, a plumbing subcontractor, was not the general contractor; did not supervise, control, or direct the plaintiff’s work; did not place or use any of the electric cords or subject cinderblock. The Court granted our motion dismissed all claims and cross-claims for contractual and common-law indemnification against our client.

(October 2021 Supreme Court, Queens County)

Big Win for the Defense Bar! – Trial Verdict Dismissing Labor Law §240(1) Claim Affirmed on Appeal!

9/22/2020

Plaintiff, a 44 year-old construction worker, was rolling a 1000 lb. steel I-beam on the ground using a long “make-shift” pry-bar. The steel I-beam rolled back, causing the bar to snap out of plaintiff’s hands and strike him in the face and head. He sustained fractured orbital bones in his face that required open reduction and internal fixation, traumatic brain injury with cognitive deficits and memory loss, neck injuries for which he underwent cervical discectomy and fusion at C3-4, and back injuries for which he had a double laminectomy and fusion at L3-4 and L4-5. Plaintiff claimed he was permanently disabled from employment and sought past and future lost wages in the amount of $1.5 million; past medical expenses of $550,000, and; future medical expenses in the amount $3 million.

Our involvement in this case began when the insurance carrier for the defendant site owner called upon us for a second opinion after former counsel recommended tendering the policy limits to settle the case. We opined that Labor Law §240(1) was not triggered under these facts, and the case was transferred to our firm to defend at trial.

The jury trial was held before Judge Robert J. McDonald in Supreme Queens. At the close of the plaintiff’s case, our firm moved for a directed verdict. We argued that §240(1) contemplated vertical motion and to allow this case to proceed under §240(1) would wrongly expand the findings of Runner and Wilinski and further undermine the purpose of Labor Law §240(1). After hearing from both sides, Judge McDonald agreed, granted our motion and dismissed plaintiff’s case as a matter of law. Plaintiff appealed.

On appeal, by unanimous decision, the Appellate Division, Second Department, affirmed the directed verdict agreeing that the case did not involve the kind of elevation-related risk contemplated by Labor Law §240(1). The court found that plaintiff and the steel beam he was rotating were both at ground level and did not call for the use of the protective devices mentioned in the statute. This case presents a shining example of the CK Difference! (Appellate Division, Second Department September 2020).

Big Win for the Defense Bar! – Trial Verdict Dismissing Labor Law §240(1) Claim Affirmed on Appeal!

9/22/2020

Plaintiff, a 44 year-old construction worker, was rolling a 1000 lb. steel I-beam on the ground using a long “make-shift” pry-bar. The steel I-beam rolled back, causing the bar to snap out of plaintiff’s hands and strike him in the face and head. He sustained fractured orbital bones in his face that required open reduction and internal fixation, traumatic brain injury with cognitive deficits and memory loss, neck injuries for which he underwent cervical discectomy and fusion at C3-4, and back injuries for which he had a double laminectomy and fusion at L3-4 and L4-5. Plaintiff claimed he was permanently disabled from employment and sought past and future lost wages in the amount of $1.5 million; past medical expenses of $550,000, and; future medical expenses in the amount $3 million.

Our involvement in this case began when the insurance carrier for the defendant site owner called upon us for a second opinion after former counsel recommended tendering the policy limits to settle the case. We opined that Labor Law §240(1) was not triggered under these facts, and the case was transferred to our firm to defend at trial.

The jury trial was held before Judge Robert J. McDonald in Supreme Queens. At the close of the plaintiff’s case, our firm moved for a directed verdict. We argued that §240(1) contemplated vertical motion and to allow this case to proceed under §240(1) would wrongly expand the findings of Runner and Wilinski and further undermine the purpose of Labor Law §240(1). After hearing from both sides, Judge McDonald agreed, granted our motion and dismissed plaintiff’s case as a matter of law. Plaintiff appealed.

On appeal, by unanimous decision, the Appellate Division, Second Department, affirmed the directed verdict agreeing that the case did not involve the kind of elevation-related risk contemplated by Labor Law §240(1). The court found that plaintiff and the steel beam he was rotating were both at ground level and did not call for the use of the protective devices mentioned in the statute. This case presents a shining example of the CK Difference! (Appellate Division, Second Department September 2020).

Big Win for the Defense Bar! – Trial Verdict Dismissing Labor Law §240(1) Claim Affirmed on Appeal!

9/22/2020

Plaintiff, a 44 year-old construction worker, was rolling a 1000 lb. steel I-beam on the ground using a long “make-shift” pry-bar. The steel I-beam rolled back, causing the bar to snap out of plaintiff’s hands and strike him in the face and head. He sustained fractured orbital bones in his face that required open reduction and internal fixation, traumatic brain injury with cognitive deficits and memory loss, neck injuries for which he underwent cervical discectomy and fusion at C3-4, and back injuries for which he had a double laminectomy and fusion at L3-4 and L4-5. Plaintiff claimed he was permanently disabled from employment and sought past and future lost wages in the amount of $1.5 million; past medical expenses of $550,000, and; future medical expenses in the amount $3 million.

Our involvement in this case began when the insurance carrier for the defendant site owner called upon us for a second opinion after former counsel recommended tendering the policy limits to settle the case. We opined that Labor Law §240(1) was not triggered under these facts, and the case was transferred to our firm to defend at trial.

The jury trial was held before Judge Robert J. McDonald in Supreme Queens. At the close of the plaintiff’s case, our firm moved for a directed verdict. We argued that §240(1) contemplated vertical motion and to allow this case to proceed under §240(1) would wrongly expand the findings of Runner and Wilinski and further undermine the purpose of Labor Law §240(1). After hearing from both sides, Judge McDonald agreed, granted our motion and dismissed plaintiff’s case as a matter of law. Plaintiff appealed.

On appeal, by unanimous decision, the Appellate Division, Second Department, affirmed the directed verdict agreeing that the case did not involve the kind of elevation-related risk contemplated by Labor Law §240(1). The court found that plaintiff and the steel beam he was rotating were both at ground level and did not call for the use of the protective devices mentioned in the statute. This case presents a shining example of the CK Difference! (Appellate Division, Second Department September 2020).

MVA Case Dismissed against Client Contractor

9/15/2020

Plaintiff sustained severe injuries when he was rear-ended by a work van operated by the co-defendant/driver. Plaintiff alleged the driver was in the course of his employment by our client and/or that our client owned and controlled the work van because our client’s name appeared on the side of the van. Through deposition testimony, work logs, title and insurance documentation, we established that our client neither employed the driver nor owned the van. The Court accepted our proof and dismissed the case against our client as a matter of law. (Suffolk County, August 2020).

Summary Judgment Dismissal of Dog Bite Case

6/1/2020

Plaintiff was bitten by a dog while visiting a tenant in a building owned personally by our client’s principal. Our client was awarded summary judgment dismissal of all claims. We demonstrated that our corporate client did not own or lease the premises, did not have a duty to maintain the premises, and, therefore, owed no duty to the plaintiff regarding the subject dog. Case dismissed! (Bronx County, June 2020).

Labor Law §240(1), 241(6), 200 claims Dismissed on Motion

5/2/2020

Plaintiff, an employee of an HVAC contractor, while installing ductwork stepped into a hole cut into the basement by the masonry subcontractor. Plaintiff sued the general contractor, and our client, the plumbing subcontractor alleging violations of Labor Law Secs. 240(1), 241(6), 200, and common law negligence. The hole was intended to house a pump, to have been installed by our client at a later date.

The Court dismissed the complaint, and all cross claims, against our client, granting our summary judgment motion. We successfully argued that our client was not a proper labor law defendant and, under the facts of this case, owed no duty to plaintiff such that it cannot be liable under common law negligence. The Court agreed, holding that our client did not exercise, nor was it granted, supervisory authority over the work site or plaintiff’s work, such that it was not an ‘owner, contractor, or agent’ subject to labor law liability. On the issue of common law negligence, the Court again agreed, holding that our client owed no duty to plaintiff, as it did not create the condition or ‘launch a force of harm’ by making the condition more dangerous. (Suffolk County, May 2020).

Labor Law §240(1), 241(6), 200 claims Dismissed on Motion

5/2/2020

Plaintiff, an employee of an HVAC contractor, while installing ductwork stepped into a hole cut into the basement by the masonry subcontractor. Plaintiff sued the general contractor, and our client, the plumbing subcontractor alleging violations of Labor Law Secs. 240(1), 241(6), 200, and common law negligence. The hole was intended to house a pump, to have been installed by our client at a later date.

The Court dismissed the complaint, and all cross claims, against our client, granting our summary judgment motion. We successfully argued that our client was not a proper labor law defendant and, under the facts of this case, owed no duty to plaintiff such that it cannot be liable under common law negligence. The Court agreed, holding that our client did not exercise, nor was it granted, supervisory authority over the work site or plaintiff’s work, such that it was not an ‘owner, contractor, or agent’ subject to labor law liability. On the issue of common law negligence, the Court again agreed, holding that our client owed no duty to plaintiff, as it did not create the condition or ‘launch a force of harm’ by making the condition more dangerous. (Suffolk County, May 2020).

209 results found. Viewing page 1 of 24. Go to page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  . . . 20 21 22 23 24   Next